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RETHINKING CONSTITUTIONALLY
IMPERMISSIBLE PUNISHMENT
Nadia Banteka* & Erika Nyborg-Burch**
INTRODUCTION
Prisons and jails endanger the health and wellbeing of incarcerated individuals and their communities. These facilities are often overcrowded and unsanitary, 1 with limited access to medical care, 2 and no
basic sanitation and personal hygiene products unless a person can pay
the spiked prices of the jail’s commissary. 3 Public health emergencies
compound these dangers. Most recently, the spread of the COVID-19
pandemic created a crisis for people in detention, their families, and
the communities surrounding jails and prisons. For over a year, there
were no vaccines against COVID-19, new strains of the virus continue
to evade vaccine-induced immunity, and there is still no known cure
for the disease caused by the virus. For over a year, the only known
measures to mitigate the spread of this pandemic were social distancing, vigilance with hygiene and disinfectants, and proper ventilation.
Yet individuals in jails and prisons had no ability to implement these
measures in spaces that, even in the absence of a pandemic, pose
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1 CATHERINE HEARD, TOWARDS A HEALTH-INFORMED APPROACH TO PENAL REFORM?
EVIDENCE FROM TEN COUNTRIES 1 (2019).
2 Jordan Andrews, The Current State of Public and Private Prison Healthcare, WHARTON
PUB. POL’Y INITIATIVE (Feb. 24, 2017), https://web.archive.org/web/20200623211158
/https://publicpolicy.wharton.upenn.edu/live/news/1736-the-current-state-of-publicand-private-prison [https://perma.cc/392L-C4TR].
3 Stephen Raher, The Company Store: A Deeper Look at Prison Commissaries, PRISON
POL’Y INITIATIVE (May 2018), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/commissary.html
[https://perma.cc/3QQ8-P96L].
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public health risks. 4 Every decision to send a person into the jails or
prisons, or to deny requests for release, had the potential to cause severe illness and turn into a death sentence for members of communities across the country. Now, with new variants appearing across the
globe, we face an uncertain next chapter for public health.
In this Essay, we discuss how the COVID-19 pandemic has affected
our understanding of constitutionally permissible punishment. We argue, first, that the protracted failure to act by those who have had authority to do so during this public health emergency created a high
risk that incarcerated people would suffer severe illness—and even
death—in violation of due process protections and the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. 5 Second, we
suggest that a changed understanding of public safety in the context
of detention and release during public health emergencies has the potential to shift the framework even after the emergency subsides. Conceptions of what qualifies as a danger to the community and what enhances public safety have radically shifted during this time in a way that
supports release of individuals back to their communities. This shift
can spur a further interrogation of how we define constitutionally permissible punishment in a system that has fueled mass incarceration.
I.

INCARCERATION AND DETENTION AS CONSTITUTIONALLY
IMPERMISSIBLE PUNISHMENT

People in confinement have limited control over their own movement and must live in close proximity to many others, including when
they eat, sleep, and use the bathroom. They also have limited access
to soap, running water, and cleaning supplies. 6 When the virus enters
a jail, these conditions provide a tinderbox for rapid transmission. 7
The virus has myriad opportunities to get into jails: new detainees may
be brought in each day; staff come and go with their daily shifts. 8 Because individuals in jails are also more likely to have health conditions
that make severe infection more likely, exposure to the virus has the
4 Amanda Klonsky, An Epicenter of the Pandemic Will Be Jails and Prisons, if Inaction
Continues, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/16/opinion
/coronavirus-in-jails.html [https://perma.cc/6YS5-VRDZ].
5 U.S. CONST. amends. V, VIII, XIV.
6 Jennifer Gonnerman, How Prisons and Jails Can Respond to the Coronavirus, NEW
YORKER (Mar. 14, 2020), https://www.newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/how-prisons-and-jailscan-respond-to-the-coronavirus [https://perma.cc/JP53-KW2Q].
7 Nicole Wetsman, Prisons and Jails are Vulnerable to COVID-19 Outbreaks, THE VERGE
(Mar. 7, 2020, 8:30 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2020/3/7/21167807/coronavirusprison-jail-health-outbreak-covid-19-flu-soap [https://perma.cc/M6VA-E35N].
8 Id.
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potential to cause them serious injury and even death. 9 This same
transmission pattern may work in reverse, spreading infection to the
broader community, putting exponentially more people at risk. 10
Forcing individuals who have a high risk of serious illness or death
from COVID-19 to live in this tinderbox, while depriving them of access to risk-mitigation strategies, implicates their constitutional rights.
Once the State deprives someone of their liberty through incarceration, the Eighth Amendment sets a substantive limit to ensure that the
State does not fail to provide for basic human needs such as food,
clothing, medical care, and reasonable safety. 11 Depriving someone of
basic human needs, including the need for reasonable safety during
the pandemic and access to viable medical care, crosses that limit. 12
The Eighth Amendment also protects against subjection to likely future harm where it crosses this same line. 13 In Helling, the Court rejected the State’s attempt to put a temporal limit on the scope of the
Eighth Amendment: just as the State may not be deliberately indifferent to current health problems, it also cannot “ignore a condition of
confinement that is sure or very likely to cause serious illness and needless suffering the next week or month or year.” 14 The Court recognized that exposure to “a serious, communicable disease” could pose
an unreasonable risk to health, and deliberate indifference to this
harm would rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation. 15
9 Gonnerman, supra note 6.
10 See Josiah Rich, Scott Allen & Mavis Nimoh, Opinion, We Must Release Prisoners to
Lessen the Spread of Coronavirus, WASH. POST (Mar. 17, 2020, 4:01 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/03/17/we-must-release-prisoners-lessen-spread-coronavirus/ [https://perma.cc/VSG9-7ECU].
11 DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200 (1989).
12 Id. at 199–200 (“[W]hen the State takes a person into its custody and holds him
there against his will, the Constitution imposes upon it a corresponding duty to assume
some responsibility for his safety and general well-being. . . . The rationale for this principle
is simple enough: when the State by the affirmative exercise of its power so restrains an
individual’s liberty that it renders him unable to care for himself, and at the same time fails
to provide for his basic human needs—e.g., food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and reasonable safety—it transgresses the substantive limits on state action set by the Eighth
Amendment and the Due Process Clause.”).
13 See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33 (1993) (“In Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678,
682 (1978), we noted that inmates in punitive isolation were crowded into cells and that
some of them had infectious maladies such as hepatitis and venereal disease. This was one
of the prison conditions for which the Eighth Amendment required a remedy, even though
it was not alleged that the likely harm would occur immediately and even though the possible infection might not affect all of those exposed. . . . Nor can we hold that prison officials
may be deliberately indifferent to the exposure of inmates to a serious, communicable disease on the ground that the complaining inmate shows no serious current symptoms.”).
14 Id.
15 Id. at 33–34.
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The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments’ Due Process Clauses also
protect against punitive pretrial and immigration-related detention. 16
When courts assess the constitutionality of pretrial detention, they determine whether a certain condition is imposed on a detainee for the
purpose of punishment or in furtherance of another legitimate governmental purpose. 17 Where an “expressed intent to punish” is not
evident, courts must still examine whether the restriction is excessive
in relation to the purpose assigned to it. 18 A pretrial detainee can prevail under this standard by providing objective evidence that the governmental action is not rationally related to a legitimate governmental
objective or that it is excessive in relation to that purpose. 19 For individuals serving all but the most punitive sentences, the high likelihood
of severe illness and death is “grossly disproportionate to the offense.” 20 State and local officials knew—from the growing medical coverage as well as habeas petitions filed on behalf of incarcerated people—that continued incarceration during the COVID-19 pandemic
carried this risk for individuals with certain medical conditions. 21 Yet
in many circumstances, officials kept these people confined in squalid
conditions. 22 Their failure to protect the incarcerated population
from the known risk of COVID-19 and attendant consequences has arguably risen to the level of deliberate indifference, in violation of the
Eighth Amendment.
Overall, in the context of pretrial detention during the pandemic,
decisions to detain and failures to release those who are eligible for
such release have imposed a form of punishment prior to an adjudication of guilt in violation of the Fifth Amendment, for immigration detainees, or the Fourteenth Amendment, in the context of pretrial detainees. In all but the most extreme cases, sending an individual who
has a preexisting health condition into a detention setting where they
may contract serious illness and even die is excessive in relation to the

16 U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV; Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535–38 (1979) (explaining that pretrial detainees have general Fourteenth Amendment rights and analogizing
those rights to those of persons in immigration-related detention).
17 Bell, 441 U.S. at 538–39.
18 Id.
19 See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 685–67 (1978).
20 Id. at 682–83, 685.
21 See, e.g., A State-by-State Look at 15 Months of Coronavirus in Prisons, MARSHALL PROJECT (July 1, 2021, 1:00 PM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2020/05/01/a-state-bystate-look-at-coronavirus-in-prisons [https://perma.cc/T4RJ-9Y34].
22 See Allison Wexler Weiss, Habeas Corpus, Conditions of Confinement, and COVID-19, 27
WASH. & LEE J. OF C.R. & SOC. JUST. 131, 140 (2020).
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government’s public safety interests. 23 As we mentioned earlier,
COVID-19 had no known vaccines for over a year and existing treatment options appear only to reduce the risk of being hospitalized or
dying from the disease. 24 These treatment options do not cure the disease or prevent certain complications like long COVID. 25 It also
spreads far more easily than the flu, including the various Omicron
strains that are currently prevalent across the nation, with the BA.5
strain being declared as one of the most contagious viruses known to
humankind. 26 The virus remains particularly lethal to those over fiftyfive and those with comorbidities, even amongst vaccinated populations. 27 Given these circumstances, release remains the only effective
remedy to protect many people’s rights and also prevent grave suffering and death.
II.

RETHINKING INCARCERATION AND DETENTION

State and federal trial-level courts have an obligation to consider
alternatives to pretrial detention and, where their jurisdiction extends
to parole and early release, to conduct hearings for certain post-trial
detainees. In making decisions about pretrial detention, the courts
should not hold people simply because they cannot afford cash bail. 28
To subject someone to a known risk of serious illness verges on
23 We note that if a vulnerable individual cannot pay cash bail or an immigration
bond, continued detention could violate due process protections against punishment as
well as the Equal Protection Clause.
24 See COVID-19 Treatments and Medications, CDC (Aug. 5, 2022), https:
//www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/your-health/treatments-for-severe-illness.html
[https: //perma.cc/9AM2-8ZFH].
25 See Long COVID or Post-COVID Conditions, CDC (Sept. 1, 2022), https:
//www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/long-term-effects/index.html [https: //perma.cc
/DAN7-JBQY].
26 Adrian Esterman, New Covid Subvariants BA.4 and BA.5 Are the Most Contagious Yet—
and Driving Australia’s Third Omicron Wave, THE GUARDIAN (July 4, 2022, 7:16 PM), https://
www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jul/05/new-covid-variants-ba4-ba5-most-contagiousaustralia-third-omicron-wave-coronavirus-subvariants-ba-4-5
[https://perma.cc/DXP3FVQM]; Erin Prater, Move over, Measles: Dominant Omicron Subvariants BA.4 and BA.5 Could
Be the Most Infectious Diseases Known to Man, FORTUNE (July 9, 2022, 4:30 PM), https://fortune.com/2022/07/09/is-covid-omicron-more-transmissible-infectious-than-measles-ba4ba5/ [https://perma.cc/R5GJ-ZEYD].
27 Adekunle Sanyaolu et al., Comorbidity and Its Impact on Patients with COVID-19, 2 SN
COMPREHENSIVE CLINICAL MED. 1069, 1069 (2020); WASH. ST. DEP’T. OF HEALTH, COVID19 Cases, Hospitalizations, and Deaths by Vaccination Status 10–11 (Oct. 12, 2022),

https://doh.wa.gov/sites/default/files/2022-02/421-010-CasesInNotFullyVaccinated.pdf [https://perma.cc/C6FK-TEBP].
28 Mitch Arvidson, Time to Bail on Cash Bail? A Growing Number of States are Scrutinizing
Current Systems, and Exploring Alternatives Such as Use of Risk-assessment Tools, STATELINE MIDWEST, Apr. 2019, at 1, 6.
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punishment, and to subject someone to this punishment based on indigency runs afoul of due process and equal protection. 29 For those
eligible for parole or early release, the likelihood of harm should weigh
heavily in the calculus.
Courts should also reconsider the use of existing algorithms that
determine whether to release someone or to hold them in pretrial detention based on artificially intelligent risk-assessment tools, as these
algorithms were not designed to consider a public health crisis like the
one caused by the COVID-19 virus. Judges have increasingly relied
upon algorithms that are intended to measure risk of danger to the
community and flight in pretrial and sentencing decisions. 30 Yet research has exposed how these algorithms often reproduce existing biases that discriminate against people of color and disadvantaged communities in making these assessments. 31 If the courts suspend the use
of these algorithms during this public health crisis and confront questions of how to measure public safety, evolving approaches to these
questions may pave the way for challenging bias and protecting liberty
interests in bail and sentencing decisions beyond the pandemic.
Parole boards also have the power to release individuals eligible
for parole who are still being held in jail. 32 In determining whether to
grant parole, decisionmakers can and should consider the risk of illness to which the eligible individual will be exposed as well as the public health risks for all in the community when prisons are full. While
parole boards have discretion to grant or deny parole, in these exigent
circumstances it would likely be an abuse of such discretion to subject
eligible individuals, especially those most vulnerable to serious complications from COVID-19, to continued incarceration. Those same considerations about individual health conditions and the relative safety
of returning to a home and community should remain salient even after the COVID-19 pandemic makes incarceration less of a public
health crisis.
In the context of immigration, both the federal enforcement
agency, and the immigration courts have discretionary authority to

29 See Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 661–62 (1983).
30 See, e.g., State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d. 749, 753 (Wis. 2016).
31 Julia Angwin, Jeff Larson, Surya Mattu & Lauren Kirchner, Machine Bias, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016), https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-incriminal-sentencing [https://perma.cc/5PNP-63GD].
32 Jorge Renaud, Grading the Parole Release Systems of All 50 States, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Feb. 26, 2019), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/grading_parole.html
[https://perma.cc/QW33-WEAN].
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release individuals held in immigration detention. 33 These grants of
discretion contemplate some consideration of alternatives to detention. A blanket policy of no-release despite new risks would thus violate
these statutory provisions, which ought to be read in the context of the
constitutional prohibition against deprivation of liberty without process. Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, a district court enjoined Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) from implementing a no
bond policy by which it was detaining all or nearly all individuals with
no individualized determination. 34 For those who do receive individualized determinations in immigration court, immigration judges regularly set high bonds or deny bond altogether where the immigrant detainee bears the burden of proving release. 35 The Fifth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause protects these detainees from punitive detention
and prohibits ICE from imposing conditions that are excessive. 36 As
but one example of available policy changes, a March 2020 ICE notification stated that the agency would use “alternatives to detention” in
some circumstances and would not target for enforcement individuals
in or near healthcare facilities, like doctors’ offices and hospitals. 37
Federal courts also possess powers necessary to remedy constitutional violations. 38 Acting on this authority, courts across the country
recognized that continued detention in ICE facilities posed an impermissibly punitive risk to some individuals. 39 As these individuals lived
33 See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (2018); 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(c)(8) (2022); Zadvydas v. Davis,
533 U.S. 678 (2001).
34 Damus v. Nielsen, 313 F. Supp. 3d 317, 343 (D.D.C. 2018); see also Complaint,
N.Y.C.L. Union v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, No. 18-cv-11557 (S.D.N.Y Dec. 11, 2018).
35 See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19 (2022).
36 See U.S. CONST. amend. V; Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 398 (2015).
37 Maria Sacchetti & Arelis R. Hernández, ICE to Stop Most Immigration Enforcement Inside U.S., Will Focus on Criminals During Coronavirus Outbreak, WASH. POST (Mar. 18, 2020,
7:23 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/ice-halting-most-immigration-enforcement/2020/03/18/d0516228-696c-11ea-abef-020f086a3fab_story.html
[https://
perma.cc/TLV6-W8WK]. We note that the Court has agreed to hear a case in its October
2022 Term that may result in additional restrictions on the executive branch’s discretionary
authority over enforcement decisions where states claim a downstream impact. See Texas v.
United States, 40 F.4th 205 (5th Cir. 2022), cert. granted, 2022 WL 2841804, at *1 (U.S. July
21, 2022) (No. 22-58).
38 Stone v. San Francisco, 968 F.2d 850, 861 (9th Cir. 1992).
39 See, e.g., Kolawole O.T. v. Ahrendt, 466 F. Supp. 3d 457, 472 (D.N.J. 2020), appeal
dismissed sub nom., Tomiwa v. Warden Bergen Cnty. Jail, No. 20-2643, 2020 WL 8461702 (3d
Cir. Dec. 23, 2020); Jose B.R. v. Tsoukaris, No. 20-3347 (MCA), 2020 WL 2744586, at *13–
14 (D.N.J. May 27, 2020), appeal dismissed sub nom., Rufino v. Dir. Newark N.J., No. 20-2426,
2020 WL 8085109 (3d Cir. Sept. 30, 2020); Asmed B. v. Decker, 460 F. Supp. 3d 519, 522
(D.N.J. 2020); Santiago P. v. Decker, No. 20-5067, 2020 WL 2487648, at *9 (D.N.J. May 14,
2020); Leandro R.P. v. Decker, 455 F. Supp. 3d 85, 98 (D.N.J. 2020); see also Barbecho v.
Decker, No. 20-cv-2821, 2020 WL 2513468, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. May 15, 2020); Pimentel-Estrada
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for months in their communities, their lives further proved just how
excessive continued detention would have been during the pandemic.
Courts may also enter orders placing limits on a prison’s population
when overcrowding violates the Constitution. 40 For example, in cases
involving prisons and jails, federal courts have repeatedly ordered the
release of detained persons when necessary to remedy constitutional
violations caused by overcrowding. 41 However, these remedies are
more likely to be effective in securing emergency release for individuals. Efforts at class-wide relief, or systemic changes, are likely to turn
into protracted litigation battles. When this happens, federal courts
may be too slow to remedy an acute public health crisis. In extreme
circumstances, courts may no longer be available to individual petitioners in many states. During the early months of the COVID-19 pandemic, such sudden closures created backlogs on court dockets, while
individuals in jails and prisons continued to contract the virus. 42
Finally, governors have an obligation to prevent violations of constitutional rights as they exercise control over prisons and jails. They
also are often authorized to take emergency measures. 43 Staff of the
jails and prisons have been unable to control the pandemic given the
infrastructure of the facilities and the nature of this airborne and
highly transmissible virus. Thus, the responsibility for these constitutional violations extends beyond the custodians to the governors. Governors have an obligation to keep the public safe and ought to exercise
their emergency powers to release or direct other government actors

v. Barr, 464 F. Supp. 3d 1225, 1237 (W.D. Wash. 2020); Singh v. Barr, No. 20-cv-02346-VKD,
2020 WL 1929366, at *10–11 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 20, 2020); Malam v. Adducci, 452 F. Supp. 3d
643, 662 (E.D. Mich. 2020).
40 See Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 502, 511 (2011) (ordering California to reduce
crowding in its prisons where overcrowding was the “primary cause” of “severe and unlawful
mistreatment of prisoners through grossly inadequate provision of medical and mental
health care”) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(3)(E)(i) (2018)).
41 See, e.g., Duran v. Elrod, 713 F.2d 292, 297–98 (7th Cir. 1983) (concluding that
court did not exceed its authority in directing release of low-bond pretrial detainees as necessary to reach a population cap); Mobile Cnty. Jail Inmates v. Purvis, 581 F. Supp. 222, 224–
25 (S.D. Ala. 1984) (concluding that the district court properly exercised remedial powers
to order a prison’s population reduced to alleviate unconstitutional conditions and noting
other cases); Inmates of the Allegheny Cnty. Jail v. Wecht, 565 F. Supp. 1278, 1297 (W.D.
Pa. 1983) (concluding that an order to reduce overcrowding “is within our power to correct
the constitutional violations”).
42 Lyle Moran, Court Backlogs Have Increased by an Average of One-Third During the Pandemic, New Report Finds, ABA J. (Aug. 31, 2021, 12:57 PM), https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/many-state-and-local-courts-have-seen-case-backlogs-rise-during-thepandemic-new-report-finds [https://perma.cc/FUX3-697C].
43 See F. David Trickey, Comment, Constitutional and Statutory Bases of Governors’ Emergency Powers, 64 MICH. L. REV. 290, 290–91 (1965).
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to consider release, to the maximum extent of the law. At a minimum,
they can and should consider release for those with increased risk such
as people over fifty-five years of age, individuals with comorbidities, individuals who are pregnant, those eligible for parole and community
supervision or release, and those incarcerated for technical parole or
probation violations.
III.

RETHINKING THE RELEASE OF INCARCERATED AND DETAINED
INDIVIDUALS

On the one hand, the way we conceptualize public safety during
unprecedented public health emergencies is critical. Lives depend on
our collective recalibration of what qualifies as a danger to the community, and what enhances public safety. As we saw in the early
months of the COVID-19 pandemic, continued detention posed a high
danger to many individuals held in prisons and jails. The communities
they would return to also faced the present uncertainty of their lovedone’s well-being, and the future risk that this person would suffer lasting consequences of a COVID-19 infection. Many people who were
released were able to shelter at home. There, they could access
healthcare. They could also help families bear the toll of sick elders
and closed child-care facilities, among other things.
Officials also have material interest in release. Prison officials, for
example, have an interest in preventing any potential spread of
COVID-19 in their facilities. The release of people most vulnerable to
COVID-19 reduces the overall health risk for detainees and facility staff
alike. Release is also in the broader public’s interest. Potential spread
in a prison or jail quickly affects the broader communities, and fewer
outbreaks in prisons or jails correlate to fewer outbreaks in the surrounding communities. The release of people most vulnerable to serious illness from COVID-19 thus reduces the health and economic
burden on the local community and health infrastructure at large.
On the other hand, this moment allows us to rethink what we are
referring to when we talk about “danger” to a community. It casts light
on other facts that should be considered in determining whether
someone should be released. In many cases, people’s return home
during this pandemic has the potential to illustrate to courts and
agency decisionmakers the benefit to communities when individuals
are not in detention. Advocates have been working to shift this narrative before these tribunals for decades. Maybe now it will be harder to
ignore their calls.
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CONCLUSION
How we redefine what qualifies as a danger to the community and
what enhances public safety has radically shifted during the ongoing
COVID-19 pandemic. In this Essay, we show how this shift supports
release of incarcerated and detained individuals back to their communities during this public health crisis. If it turns out, as we argue, that
it makes sense to release many more of the currently incarcerated and
detained individuals at this time of crisis, we have an obligation to consider releasing these people generally, not just when a pandemic hits,
and to rework the existing metrics and system that have fueled mass
incarceration.

